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The article aims to uncover the nature and distinctive features of the 
contemporary messianic narrations in the Russian public discourse, 
as well as estimate their impact on the actual policy-making. For this 
reason, the article scrutinizes the political philosophy of Aleksandr 
Dugin, Nataliia Narochnitskaia, Egor Kholmogorov, and Vadim Tsym-
burskii. Their major messages are contrasted and compared to a vari-
ety of recent developments in Russia’s domestic and foreign policies. 
The hypothesis is put forward that the messianic narrations are fur-
tive, though unalienable factors which propel and justify Russian do-
mestic and foreign policies. Therefore, it is always worth considering 
Russian policy-making through the prism of the nation-wide religious 
self-identification, as well as acknowledging a number of ‘eschatologi-
cal duties’ which derive from this self-identification. Finally, the article 
provides an overview to the Western scholarly perspectives on Russian 
messianism with a specific emphasis on British and US contributors. 
Keywords: Russian foreign policy, Russian messianism, Russian 
expansionism, Third Rome, Dugin, Narochnitskaia, Kholmogorov, 
Tsymburskii.
Orthodox backbone of the Russian state
The fall of Constantinople became a great occasion for the Grand 




dom.1 Filling the vacuum of power, they proclaimed themselves heirs 
to Byzantine Emperors which automatically ‘converted’ the land under 
their rule into the mythical Third Rome. In a deeply religious medieval 
European society this made a lot of sense. According to the Second 
Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians, there should always be a harbour 
of virtue in the world of sin to withstand the arrival of Antichrist.2 As 
both Roman and Byzantium empires had fallen and, thus, had failed 
to become such harbours, the Grand Duchy of Moscow remained the 
only power capable of succeeding.3 Morini defined this as Milleniarism 
in the Russian political and religious culture – belief in the imminence 
of Judgement Day and getting ready for it.4 The idea of their Duchy as 
the salvation of humankind had started to take shape. 
Along with the Third Rome, the salvation of humankind had also 
much to do with the theological concept of Katechon (from the Greek 
ó Κατέχων, ‘the withholding’), which the Grand Dukes of Moscow also 
applied to their fiefdom. As one of the interpretations of the Second 
Epistle, Katechon originally emerged in the times of the Roman Em-
pire and stood for the kingdom of vigour and true faith which pro-
tected the world from the advent of the Antichrist.5 To be efficient 
with this task, the kingdom should have secured a symphony between 
political and religious powers.6 In the early Russian tradition, Kate-
chon became a euphemism of Moscow as the Third Rome thus pro-
viding additional justification for such a heredity. With the flow of 
time the concept of Katechon evolved and embraced imperialistic fla-
vour; apart from defensive and protective it also acquired offensive 
connotations.7 
The religious component has always been – and still remains – of 
notable importance in interpreting Russian approaches to political re-
ality. This becomes especially apparent in the light of Western secular-
ism and clear separation of religion from politics. Engström is one of 
the researchers who systematically connects historical and contempo-
rary Russian policy-making to the state’s unique self-proclaimed mes-
sianic mission. The latter serves as a legitimization for Russian ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ geopolitical expansion into other states, as well as nurtures 
neo-imperial ambitions.8 In contemporary domestic policies, as Eng-
ström claims, the religious component manifests itself in at least two 
dimensions. Primarily, it serves as an ideological substitute to the com-
munist idea of the ‘bright future’ which proved to be fruitless. Second-
ly, it is commonly perceived as a backbone to a ‘sovereign’ and ‘Russian’ 
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alternative to a non-adjustable liberal democracy. In short, the new do-
mestic political narrative is evidently conservative, strongly messianic, 
and full of anti-Western – or specifically anti-American – sentiment.9
In his turn, Sidorov argues that Christianity – in its Orthodox 
branch  – is much more than a religion for Russians. From the very 
early times it directly impacted the construction of an indigenous 
worldview. As for today, according to Sidorov, Russia conducts ‘Ortho-
doxy-related geopolitics’ which resides in adjusting the church’s his-
toriography for geopolitical construction of ‘various Orthodox, qua-
si-Orthodox or even secular currents in post-Soviet Russia’.10
The article puts forth the hypothesis that religious self-identifica-
tion and messianic narrations are unalienable constituents of Russian 
domestic and foreign policies. They should always be considered by 
political scholars and practitioners when interpreting and predicting 
the Kremlin’s advancements. Apart from this, the article argues that 
Russia has never been restrained by frameworks of a post-Westphalian 
sovereign state. Instead, in the cases of need and opportunity, it has 
frequently justified its assertive policies through self-branding itself 
as the ‘force for good’ – or the Orthodox Katechon – which uses its 
sovereignty as a tool to perform a global eschatological mission. One 
may speculate about the overall efficiency of this kind of a self-brand-
ing, however, its social impact cannot be disregarded, especially with-
in Russia itself. The idea of struggling and fighting for the Orthodox 
Christian values has always worked to rally thousands of Russians 
around the flag. This idea continues to reoccur in contemporary public 
discourse and remains in the centre of attention of numerous Russian 
political philosophers and masterminds. 
The article introduces the following research questions: 
1. What is the nature of contemporary Russian messianic narra-
tions?
2. Who are the major masterminds of Russian messianic narra-
tions and what are their messages?
3. What is the real impact of Russian messianic narrations on prac-
tical politics and public discourse?
4. How do the Western academia react to the Russian messianic 
narrations as a justification for the state’s assertive policies, spe-
cifically foreign policies?
As methodology is concerned, it will be based on Østbø’s assess-




temporary Russian political thought. Based on the diversity of inter-
pretations of the Third Rome concept, Østbø pointed out four major 
‘schools’ and highlighted crucial messages promoted by their master-
minds (see Table 1): 
Dugin is the founder and leading ideologist, as well as argu-
ably the most outspoken popularizer, of neo-Eurasianism … 
Kholmogorov is a prominent ‘young conservative’ and ideolo-
gist of Orthodox nationalism. Tsymburskii was also affiliated 
with the ‘young conservatives,’ but never departed from his 
irreconcilable isolationist stance. He is arguably the most in-
novative writer and the most respected academic … Naroch-
nitskaia is a leading neo-Slavophile and pan-Slavist, she wrote 
a best-selling history book, has been a parliamentary deputy 
and participates in Kremlin-supported ‘soft-power projects’ 
(i.e. think tanks) abroad … Based on their general views I have 
classified Tsymburskii as ‘core oriented’ and ‘less Orthodox’; 
Dugin as ‘imperialist’ and ‘less Orthodox’; Narochnitskaia as 
‘core oriented’ and ‘Orthodox’; and Kholmogorov as ‘imperial-
ist’ and ‘Orthodox’.11
Østbø’s framework of four ‘schools’ each with its philosophic es-
sence and leadership will provide the methodological backbone for 
assessing contemporary interpretations of Russian messianism, ex-
pansionism, and statecraft in this article. Østbø’s framework allows us 
to clearly highlight the connection between the transcendent justifi-
cations and indigenous policy-making in Russia on both international 
and domestic levels. With Østbø’s framework looking overly simplistic 
at first glance, there exists no apparent necessity to complicate it or 
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Masterminds of Russian messianism and their visions of 
statecraft
Speaking of the first school defined by Østbø (neo-Eurasianism), one 
of its most outspoken representatives today is Aleksandr Dugin, a Rus-
sian national conservative. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Dugin continued to perceive the assertiveness of Russian foreign poli-
cy – especially in the Asian dimension – as something natural and un-
avoidable. From his perspective, Russia as the major land-power finds 
itself in an eternal struggle with the global maritime Carthage, which 
is the US. Russia is the new pivot of history, ideologically strong and 
consistent, legatee of all ancient Rome’s virtues while the US is a global 
demagogue, embodiment of the Carthage vices, which seeks to secure 
its geopolitical objectives at all costs.13 Thus, no other power after the 
fall of Constantinople – the Second Rome – possesses enough power 
to redesign the world order and make it fair once for all. Here one may 
find similarity to Toynbee’s reflections on Russia’s struggle with the 
Franks; the latter is used as the collective term for Western states.14 
However, Toynbee’s struggle was a kind of an eternal civilizational 
competition while Dugin goes as far as propagating the total destruc-
tion of opponents; he often cites Cato the Elder and his famous ‘Car-
thage should be destroyed’.15 
It is worth noting that the category of Christianity is not specifically 
emphasized in Dugin’s picture of Russia as the Third Rome or in assess-
ing Russian messianism.16 From his perspective, that was not religion, 
but lifestyle and cultural flexibility of the title nation which allowed 
the Russian empire to emerge, expand, and embrace heterogeneities.17 
Going further with this argument, Christian faith did not prevent the 
fall of the First Rome as the global defender; historically, many early 
Christians desired this to happen.18 Therefore, as Dugin deduces, the 
value of Orthodoxy should not be overestimated in justifying Russian 
expansion and messianism. 
Dugin argues that Russia has no other way to exist except for be-
ing victorious and a constantly growing Empire: ‘The whole history of 
Russia is the history of the construction of the Empire. Russia either 
becomes the Empire or disappears’.19 In order to prosper and fulfil its 
mission, Russia should build reliable alliances with Germany, Iran, and 
Japan; Dugin defines this as the New Empire.20 Apart from this, Rus-
sia is doomed to establish firm control over Belarus, Ukraine, Mongo-




strengthen its position as the heartland and jockey for commanding 
the world, as MacKinder provisioned it.21 
According to Dugin, Russia, as the only geopolitical entity combin-
ing true Orthodox faith with true political leadership, should unite and 
lead other nations – especially the above mentioned Germany, Iran, 
and Japan – against Carthage.22 Criticizing the superiority of religion 
in empire-building, Dugin strongly supports the idea of inseparability 
of altar and throne in his reflections; he calls it a natural symphony. 
Dugin also belongs to the cohort of supporters of the Katechon idea. 
However, his understanding of Katechon is imperialistic in a sense that 
Russia should ‘liberate’ and ‘lead’ other nations against a global ene-
my. Thus, Russian expansion throughout history was nothing else but a 
geopolitical manifestation of a sacred mission aimed at the unification 
of giant Eurasian territories into an eschatological and apocalyptic type 
of state.23 Continuing with this point, Østbø concludes: ‘Since the Rus-
sians are a chosen nation and a God-bearing people, no rules that apply 
to other nations concern the Russians ... Consequently, to kill for the 
Third Rome is not a necessary evil, but a moral imperative’.24
In a word, the utter objective of the Russian sacred messianism re-
sides in an annihilation of the enemy – the pure evil – defined as the 
Carthage and currently represented by the US and Atlantic sea powers. 
In its turn, the utter objective of Russian imperialism resides in scru-
pulous organizing of other nations – the pure good – under one lead-
ership, even if they are not aware of the eschatological mission.25 The 
religious kinship of Russia’s immediate European neighbours serves as 
a proper ground and proper justification to meddle into their affairs. 
Russia’s statecraft is seen as a perpetual ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ expansion. 
Nevertheless, Dugin’s narration often looks paradoxical and even 
mind-bending. While reading his books, one should be ready to en-
counter unexpected deductions, some of which are hard to believe in. 
Apart from this, his books contain a plethora of contradictions and 
may be regarded – in some respect – as a masterpiece of elegant dem-
agogy. Umland defines the overall Dugin philosophy as a very danger-
ous one, as it demonstrates clear appreciation for fascism.26
Similar to Dugin, Nataliia Narochnitskaia also stresses the impor-
tance of unique spirituality in understanding Russia and its historic 
mission. However, she is not as statist and Eurasia-charmed as Dugin; 
she represents the conservative Orthodox wing of Russian national-
ists, who predominantly share pan-Slavist and Europeanist views.27
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She constructs her narration on the dichotomy between Ortho-
dox Russia and the Anglo-Saxon West, treating the latter a priori as 
God-alienated and heretic. According to Narochnitskaia, the history 
of humankind is a by-product of interactions between different reli-
gious groups and ideas.28 Thus, it is impossible to interpret history by 
removing the spiritual element, as the West does it. Europe loses its 
identity by secularization and inappropriately replacing spiritual vir-
tues with liberal democracy. Moreover, total secularization makes the 
West unavoidably hostile towards Russia. As Østbø summarizes Na-
rochnitskaia’s major ideas: ‘The Russian state’s expansion was for the 
most part in self-defence and can be justified by international law … 
[The Western view on Russia – O.K.] is stereotypical and essentially 
false, partly because important research on Russia is not objective. It 
is rooted in heretical and inhuman thought and misunderstandings 
and is closely related to geopolitics, i.e. to the desire to conquer and 
annihilate Russia’.29
Narochnitskaia argues that Russia managed to preserve its spiritual 
identity because it avoided Renaissance frivolity, Descartian rational-
ism, the revolutions of the 18th century, and the growth of Protestant 
ethics of labour and wealth. Since the very beginning, the Orthodoxy 
as a true faith existed in Russia in its purest form, which makes Russia 
a unique and superior nation, especially as its spiritual morality is con-
cerned. This perspective allows Narochnitskaia to present her narra-
tion as ultimately truthful and notoriously uncompromising. 
The Third Rome concept in the understanding of Narochnitskaia 
is solely a religious one. Third Rome is not imperialist, but imperial; 
it is more spiritual than secular; it should not be regarded beyond its 
historical context. This said, the Anglo-Saxon West misinterprets the 
whole idea of Russia as the Third Rome. It is not about building a strong 
mega-state – the global empire – where Christians could feel secure, 
but an attempt to build a strong community imbued with Christian 
religion.30 Autocracy in such a community – which may, but does not 
have to, surpass state’s borders – is the only truly form of governance. 
The existence of such a community is a dire need for the salvation of 
all humankind.31 
Coming back to geopolitical issues, Narochnitskaia perceives the 
struggle of global super-powers for control over the space between the 
Baltic and the Black Seas as of the paramount importance. The An-




ing for acquisition, in MacKinder’s terms, the access to the Heartland. 
From this perspective the democratization of the post-communist 
European states is an artificial process; it neither reflects indigenous 
nation-forming trends, nor should be regarded as some kind of libera-
tion. Narochnitskaia defines it as a straightforward implementation of 
Anglo-Saxon strategies aimed at penetration into the traditionally Or-
thodox area.32 These arrogant moves undermine the overall geopolit-
ical architecture, question the pivotal role of Russia, and lead to some 
very grave consequences. For instance, the recent geopolitical frictions 
on Anatolian peninsula, Balkans, in the Middle East, and Eastern Eu-
rope emerged because of the Western negligence.33 
Narochnitskaia goes even further stating that the Anglo-Saxon ac-
cusation of Russia in expansionism serves as a mask for the former to 
hide its imperialist desires.34 Therefore, the majority of Russia’s trou-
bles derive from Western hostility towards Slavs, or even towards the 
whole Orthodox world. In this light it is perfectly moral, right, and du-
tiful for the Russian leaders to withstand assaults from the Anglo-Sax-
ons. Apparently, this requires the construction of an authoritative sov-
ereign entity capable of securing the Orthodox faith on lands where it 
has been practised for ages; here Narochnitskaia arrives with the term 
Russian fiefdom to define these lands.35 The unification of all Orthodox 
peoples – Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Greeks, and others – is necessary to 
address the geopolitical, demographic, and ideological challenges of 
the modern world, which have much do with the Western vices.36 
According to Narochnitskaia, Russia does not expand into third 
states, but defends what has traditionally been Orthodox and Byzan-
tine. If, to paraphrase, Russia always strengthens its presence in lands 
which are targeted by the Anglo-Saxon West; it prevents the latter 
from erasing the rich spiritual culture in these lands for the sake of 
heretic emptiness and liberal democracy. Acting assertively in the in-
ternational arena, Russia ruins Western deceptive plans and reinforces 
the organic Orthodox regimes whenever necessary. By doing so – pre-
dominantly in the European dimension – Russia indirectly changes the 
way the world looks like. This has always been the role of Russians in 
the global history. 
Thirdly, Østbø defines Egor Kholmogorov as a self-proclaimed na-
tionalist and partisan of a self-invented theory of pragmatic imperial-
ism. His views emphasize the unquestioned superiority of Orthodox 





Seemingly flexible and inclusive, Kholmogorov’s nationalism nev-
ertheless is very dichotomic. Its nature can be best illustrated through 
the structure of concentric circles. In the core of the structure the title 
Russian nation resides, which shapes and spreads the only correct ver-
sion of Russian identity. Other ethnicities – or distinctive social groups 
such as Oldbelievers, Pomors, and others – simply orbit around that 
sense-awarding core; some farther, some closer, but none willing to 
exist on their own. Kholmogorov argues that Russia is a political impe-
rial nation which unites citizens who recognize Russia as the worthy 
state to live for and live in.38 This inclusiveness provides an appropriate 
environment for a hassle-free coexistence. 
Kholmogorov admires the imperial order and awards it with nu-
merous positive features. For him, the empire represents the ultimate 
religious form of governance and thus serves as an appropriate tool to 
convey God’s grace to Earth. In particular, this applies to Russia and 
the sacred mission of its nation; Russia needs to be an empire to fulfil 
itself.39 Going further with this argument, it is only Russia who can 
ever become a true Holy Empire, the Third Rome, or the Katechon, 
which possesses enough strength and vigour to act for the good of 
humankind.40 That said, Russia has a transcendent right to expand in 
order to strengthen itself and create some kind of a sacred space inhab-
ited and governed by Russians;41 thus, expanding and Russification – in 
its wider meaning – is the only justified and appropriate geopolitical 
behaviour. According to Kholmogorov, ‘Russians always “defend”, even 
when it might seem that they attack’.42 
Imperialism and Orthodoxy in foreign policy are complementary 
for Kholmogorov. One should not only apply a ‘setting’ of religion to 
understand Russia, as Narochnitskaia argues, but Russia is the only 
power which applies religion properly in the world context. Glob-
al affirmation of Orthodoxy serves as a shield against physical and 
metaphysical threats. Even the Western heretic and “anti-imperial” 
states are protected by Russia from the destructive elements which 
can simply not break through the vast Russian heartland: starting 
from Mongol invasion ending with the contemporary Islamic ter-
rorism; these and others symbolize metaphysical evil in its physical 
incarnation.43 Kholmogorov argues that if Russia fails, there will be 
no Fourth Rome, but instead the Apocalypse. He is also sure that 
Russians should apply all means possible – including the nuclear de-




sion. As Engström presents Kholmogorov’s understanding of Russia 
as the Katechon: 
Katechon “stands on the bridge between the Antichrist and the 
world and which does not let the Antichrist into the world. Now-
adays it is not a bridge but rather a manhole, the lid of which is 
removed from time to time, and some vampires, or werewolves 
or murderers come out of this hole. The Russian tarpaulin boot 
stamps on that lid, and restores the silence for some time. The 
crawling beast knows that if it shows itself too much, the Rus-
sian will not hesitate to blast it together with the whole world. 
Because ‘there shall not be the fourth one’, and if before us there 
was the Flood, after us there is only the Apocalypse.”44
Following this logic, contemporary Orthodoxy is not purely a re-
ligion, but the uncompromising justification for Russia to become 
the empire-defender and the ultimate stabilizer of global processes. 
The doom of this mission penetrates the Russian military-industrial 
complex and forces it to be ready for the intrusion of global evil – un-
der various guises. As no other options exist, Russia should be strong 
enough to face its predefined future any moment and in full arms.45 
Developing this argument, Kholmogorov arrives with the concept of 
Nuclear Orthodoxy. The latter requires from Russia to possess enough 
nuclear weapons to defend Orthodox values – and thus defend the 
whole world from transcendent evil – as only the truly Orthodox state 
can do.46 Naturally, the empire-defender should be governed by au-
thoritarian leaders with almost unlimited control over their people; in 
their turn, people should be conscious enough to mobilize against evil 
at the very first request.47 
Kholmogorov’s philosophic reflections are utterly dichotomous and 
ultimately Russia-centric. He claims that it is only Russia who can fight 
global evil (which is visible only for Russians). Fighting that evil is the 
self-proclaimed Russian mission for the sake of all humankind. This 
type of apocalyptic thinking – which also justifies unlimited and prag-
matic Russian expansion – does not inspire trust. On the contrary, it 
appears extremely worrying if one assesses Kholmogorov’s elusive ra-
tionale for using the Russian nuclear arsenal. 
Finally, Vadim Tsymburskii can be defined as the most consistent 
anti-imperialist and isolationist. Østbø writes that the philosophy of 
Tsymburskii represents the views of a new generation of moderate 
Russian nationalist intellectuals.48 
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Tsymburskii favours a civilizational approach to explain global 
processes. That said, he regards Russia as a unique civilization which 
emerged as early as the 16th century.49 Since that time Russia as the 
Third Rome – which he defines as the locked spiritual community of 
Orthodox people – has existed in the environment of apostates. Actu-
ally, Russia became an isolated Orthodox island which is foretold to 
stand alone in the ocean of disbelief.50 It is separated from the West 
by a belt of geopolitically ‘unstable’ states and cultures – the so called 
Great Limitrof – which prevent careless penetration of all Western 
ideas into its heartland.51 This transforms Russia into a self-organized 
‘stable’ geopolitical system with its unique geopolitical memory and 
identity.52
As a civilizationalist, Tsymburskii criticizes globalization and the 
impact it has made on international relations. He specifically disap-
proves the agility of the Western states to violate national sovereign-
ties in the name of protection of human rights and other values. Tsym-
burskii claims that civilizational uniqueness – nurtured within the 
borders of the state – sees its utter enemy in any invader who crosses 
the border under any alien justification. The NATO bombardment of 
Yugoslavia in 1999, thus, was a severe crime from Tsymburskii’s per-
spective; this crime stirred the indigenous ecumene, caused a domino 
effect, and indirectly brought to life another atrocity, the 9/11 attacks. 
In a word, the isolationist civilizational approach makes Tsymburskii 
praise the self-containment and self-sufficiency of every state. These 
features – at least in the Russian case – constitute the source of power 
which may hypothetically attract states-‘straights’ from the Great Lim-
itrof to the Third Rome in future.53 
As one can see, Tsymburskii, unlike all three of the above mentioned 
philosophers, does not clearly support any kind of expansionism. He 
also speaks against a profound Russian engagement into European 
affairs, which includes – among other issues – the transplanting of 
ideas from Europe onto Russian soil. According to Østbø, ‘an ardent 
anti-imperialist, he argued that Russia’s historical obsession with ex-
pansion into Europe had been destructive, as expansion was always 
followed by forced retreat. At the same time, he was much less pre-
occupied with Slavicness, ruralism and even Orthodoxy than other 
non-imperialists.’54
In the light of his anti-imperialism, Tsymburskii deduces that Russia 




from itself and alienating itself from the non-Slavic republics on its 
borders. This is the same as when the Grand Duchy of Moscow became 
‘more Orthodox’ after the fall of Constantinople. Therefore, Tsymbur-
skii argues that Russia should not ‘expand’ to bring Orthodoxy to oth-
ers and thus fulfil its mission; its mission is different as it resides in 
erecting a spiritually strong Third Rome within its borders. By doing 
this Russia will undergo its civilizational purification and return to the 
old Slavic roots. 
To present Tsymburskii’s philosophy in a nutshell, he argued that 
Russia’s post-Cold War borders were adequate and there was no need 
to project power onto new territories. Moreover, he condemned impe-
rial expansionism, claiming that it brings more negative than positive 
effects; especially as the expansion into Europe is concerned. Russia, 
according to Tsymburskii, is a civilizational island and should always 
keep its distance from the outer world. Those states and nations situ-
ated on the periphery or on the borderlands between civilizations are 
likely to drift towards Russia by themselves. Even if they do not, this 
should not become a major issue of Russia’s concern55. 
Drawing conclusions on the general features of contemporary 
Russian messianic philosophy it is worth referring to observations of 
Khrushcheva:
Although Russia’s position in the world could never exist in 
a vacuum, with a remarkable consistency the country insists 
on defining its global role on its own, as a unique and spe-
cial nation. The Russians insist that their destiny to rule the 
world isn’t influenced by other international conditions, such 
as economy, war, or energy and natural resources supply and 
distribution.56 
Three of the four addressed above philosophers portray Russia as an 
outstanding and mysterious entity endowed with some kind of a tran-
scendent aureole. Because of this, the state takes global responsibility 
for shaping fates of other nations and civilizations, either through co-
ercion or attraction. The burden for Russians here resides in the ne-
cessity to fulfil their mission regardless of the worlds’ protests; thus, 
Russians pertinently struggle, but stubbornly proceed because they 
understand that their mission is a priori incomprehensible for the logic 
of non-Russians. These and other similar messages are being regular-
ly sent into the Russian public discourse. Only selected philosophers, 





It is also worth stressing that the reflections of the four mentioned 
above philosophers can hardly be defined as properly academic. Their 
work with facts and arguments, so crucial for Western science, some-
times lacks consistency and accuracy. At the same time, their narra-
tion may look excessively metaphoric. This is especially common for 
Kholmogorov who, actually, may not have even acquired the proper 
higher education qualifications.57 
Western views on Russian messianism and statehood
Addressing the Western philosophic and geopolitical views on Russia, 
one may hardly encounter any understanding of its messianism, ex-
ceptionalism, or ‘duty’ before humankind. On the contrary, Russia’s 
aggressive foreign policy is defined by many in the West as an existen-
tial threat. 
As early as the age of Enlightenment, Montesquieu claimed that 
Russia was a huge prison lead by the autocratic monarch whose rule – 
as well as the rule of his favoured nobility – was based on fear. Rousseau 
and Diderot shared a similar opinion.58 Moreover, Diderot condemned 
the autocracy as a major obstacle for any progress. Even if the monarch 
decided to implement political reforms, they would not reflect the will 
of the people and thus cease to exist in the short run. The reforms 
of Catherine the Great were exemplary in this regard. Inspired by the 
ideas of French philosophers, she provided common people with more 
liberties, but this resulted in anarchy and increased social tensions. 
Thus, she reversed reforms and awarded the nobility with even more 
power than ever before; paradoxically, this turn reflected one example 
of absolutist misconduct which led to the revolution in France.59 
A fair number of the contemporary British and US assessments of 
Russian messianism and statecraft are in line with what was argued 
during Enlightenment times. Specifically, as Russian interpretation of 
the Third Rome concept is concerned, Arnold J. Toynbee should be 
named as one of the leading scholars here. He stated that through-
out centuries, Russians cherished the feeling of their belonging to the 
Byzantine civilization, which had always conflicted with the Western 
one. The latter, in its stead, was perceived as akin to Byzantine, but 
much more aggressive and defective, and thus should be resisted and 
contained. It was, however, more technologically advanced. Toynbee 
argued that Russians lived in constant stress that their Byzantine be-




that stress, Russians applied tactics of borrowing the newest technol-
ogies, incorporating them into the indigenous discourse, and turning 
them afterwards against the West. For instance, this was the case with 
the atomic bomb. Toynbee claimed that the Russian aggressiveness 
and expansionism was, above all, a counter-offensive of a ‘spiritually 
holistic’ and conservative society against the threats coming from its 
‘heretic’ and protean arch-rival. From a wider perspective, this had al-
ways been a traditional way of policy-making between the Byzantine 
and Western civilizations; the competition of the Heirs of the Promise 
with whom the future lay: ‘When Byzantium and the West are at odds, 
Byzantium is always right and the West is always wrong’.60 Thus, Rus-
sia’s alignment to the Byzantine legacy – which envisages the subju-
gation of the church and society to the state’s interest – will always be 
criticized by the West. In turn, the West – because of its pragmatism, 
secularism, and feeling of superiority – will always be misunderstood 
by Russia and remain impenetrable for its values. Above all, the West 
will never go along with Russia’s dictum of its spiritual exclusiveness 
and certainty of being the only ‘true doer’ regardless of circumstances.
Unlike Toynbee with his moderate approach, Harvard historian 
Richard Pipes claimed that Russia had always favoured brutality and 
primitivism in its foreign policy. There existed no reasonable justifi-
cation behind its messianic idea, except from its overinflated ego. Ac-
cording to Pipes, the Third Rome brand and respective ‘obligations’ 
were unilaterally adopted by the Dukes of Moscow and popularized 
among their nationals. No one actually knew what stood behind the 
brand, but that did not discourage Dukes from awarding it with some 
transcendent meaning and starting conquests. As Pipes writes: 
Heady ideas now began to circulate in the towns and villages 
of north-eastern Russia. Princes, whose ancestors had to crawl 
on all fours for the amusement of the khan and his court, now 
traced their family descent to Emperor Augustus and their 
crown to an alleged Byzantine investiture. Talk was heard of 
Moscow being the ‘Third Rome,’ destined for all time to replace 
the corrupted and fallen Romes of Peter and Constantine. Fan-
tastic legends began to circulate among the illiterate people, 
linking the largely wooden city on the Moskva river with dimly 
understood events from biblical and classical history.61
Because of his staunchness, Pipes became the major target for Na-
rochnitskaia, who constantly accuses him of utter misinterpretations 
51
Ostap Kushnir
and distortions of the history of Russia. According to Narochnitskaia, 
Pipes is the classical example of a secularized Anglo-Saxon scientist 
who lacks the appropriate tools to assess Russian civilizational com-
plexities fully and obtain a consistent picture. 
Daniel B. Rowland also raised the issue that Western academia and 
statesmen had always perceived Russia as an inherently aggressive state. 
From its very dawn, the whole idea of Russian statehood imminently 
implied readiness to conflicts and wars. As Rowland presented it:
This idea, which sometimes seems like the only idea that the 
general public knows about Muscovite Russia apart from the 
imagined character and reign of Ivan the Terrible, has helped 
to create the impression that Muscovite Russia was exotic and 
expansionist, a worthy predecessor of the ‘evil empire’ that oc-
cupied people’s attention in the 1980s and before. This image 
of Muscovy, in turn, promotes the notion in the minds of Rus-
sians and foreigners alike that Russia is destined by her Mus-
covite past to behave in certain ways.62
The US ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of the Cold War ar-
chitects, George F. Kennan, stated the following of the Soviet Commu-
nists: ‘From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged 
they carried with them a scepticism to the possibilities of permanent 
and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their doc-
trinaire ‘rightness,’ they insisted on the submission or destruction of all 
competing power’.63 As one may see, Kennan reiterated the idea of Rus-
sians perceiving themselves as ‘true doers’ under strong unchallenged 
leadership, which often entailed the destruction of external competi-
tive forces.
More recently, Robert C. Blitt also notes that the influence of the 
Russian Orthodox Church on the contemporary Kremlin policy-mak-
ing goes beyond its spiritual domain. The only Patriarch Cyryl enjoys 
very good connections to state officials and plays a notable role in 
shaping and promoting the Russian foreign policy objectives. Blitt un-
equivocally points to the amalgamation of the religious and political 
agendas – regardless of their formal constitutional separateness – in 
Russian modus existendi, which makes the Kremlin advocate the Or-
thodox ‘traditional’ values on the domestic level and overseas.64 This 
amalgamation can never be regarded positively as it leads to position-
ing the religious institutions above law and sovereignty. Here is how 




To be certain, the unfolding relationship [between the Church 
and the government – O.K.] has fomented a counter-intuitive 
situation, whereby a constitutionally declared secular state 
promotes a particular religious agenda as part of its foreign 
policy on the global stage. The consequences of this partner-
ship have serious implications at the international level, man-
ifested in efforts to supplant universal human rights norms 
and legitimate the rationale that certain select “traditional” or 
“major” religions merit greater influence in the formulation of 
international rules than others… [Apart from this] Russia’s ne-
glect of explicit constitutional directives in the foreign policy 
context compounds the already negative treatment afforded 
to domestic human rights protections intended to safeguard.65
Finally, Daniel P. Payne adds to Blitt’s conclusions that the Russian 
Orthodox Church has established a profound symbiosis with the Rus-
sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Church provides support – insti-
tutionalized through the respective working group in 2003 – for the 
Ministry’s strategic activities. In particular, Payne underscores three 
layers of this support. Primarily, the Church contributes to the devel-
opment and implementation of national security objectives, specifi-
cally ‘spiritual security’. Secondly, the Church serves as the interme-
diate and mechanism to re-acquire the lost Soviet property which the 
Kremlin perceives as rightfully theirs. Thirdly, the Church serves as a 
magnifier of the Kremlin’s influence in the world through the use of its 
networks and the promotion of Russia’s strategic interests. The latter 
also entails keeping the broadly understood ‘Russian diaspora’ under 
one centralised cultural and political umbrella. Payne argues that if 
Russia aims to restore its superpower status – and there is no apparent 
evidence to deny this – than an appropriate tool is needed. The Rus-
sian Orthodox Church with its geopolitical ‘messianic’ potential and 
non-subjugation to the foreign ‘secular’ agendas can easily become 
such a tool.66 
Bearing all of the above mentioned in mind, the rivalry between 
Orthodox Russia and the ‘Carthaginian’ West should never come as a 
surprise; it cyclically reappears in history. Haukkala stresses that even 
if Russia tries, the principles of Western coexistence and democratic 
identity cannot be incorporated genuinely into the state’s nature.67 In-
stead, centuries-old Russian traditional expansionism seems to consti-





the latest proof in the post-Cold War experience. Deliberate attempts 
under President Yeltsin to preserve and enhance Russian geopolitical 
importance through democratic mechanisms were faulty.68 Therefore, 
Putin’s return to assertive outward-looking policies was predictable; 
it is the return to Byzantium roots which successfully nourished the 
Russian Tsardom, Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union. 
Repercussion of Russian messianism on real-life policy making
The impact of messianic narrations on the Russian public and political 
realities is paradoxical. Even if people do not recognize themselves as 
conscientious practitioners, they do agree, nevertheless, to the pivot-
al role of religion in a society. According to the most recent Levada 
Center survey Russians about Religion, 35 percent of Russians do not 
attend religious institutions or services at all, 16 percent attend them 
once a year, and 13 percent attend them less than once a year. Overall, 
these are 64 percent of the state’s citizens who do not practice their 
faith according to all canons and traditions. Apart from this, 62 percent 
of Russian Orthodox and Catholic Christians do not find it necessary 
to receive Communion at all. The paradox here is that 68 percent of 
respondents all across Russia define themselves as Orthodox Chris-
tians.69 
Speaking of the state’s leaders, they regularly reiterate that Russian 
identity is incomplete without its religious constituent. Specifically, 
Putin himself stated a couple of times that the Russian state, people, 
and Orthodoxy are indivisible. As van Herpen presents: ‘In August 
2011, after a visit to a monastery in a Solovki Islands in the White Sea, 
he said that Russia is “the guardian of Christianity”, and he recalled 
that his country was traditionally known as “Holy Russia”. Without the 
Orthodox religion, he said, “Russia would have difficulty in becoming 
a viable state. It is thus very important to return to this source”’.70 Addi-
tionally, Blitt cites Minister of Culture Alexander Avdeev, who under-
lined the connection of Russian culture with Russian Orthodoxy even 
earlier, in 2009: ‘Russian culture will flourish and remain the centre of 
the national idea only if it will be in very close dialogue with the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church, if it is connected with the understanding that 
the spiritual and historical value are both sacred values’.71
In general, Russian leaders and decision-makers appear to be very 
sympathetic to the messianic narratives as popularized by political 




and reinforce the symbiosis of a state with the Orthodox Church. For 
instance, looking at the 1999 National Security Concept of Russian 
Federation, one may find a ‘spiritual security’ objective among oth-
ers. It stands for the intention to defend traditional values in the light 
of ‘aggressive expansion’ of the Western world. This justifies utiliza-
tion of networks and parishes of Orthodox Church as instruments for 
moderating inter-cultural experiences within selected communities 
and territories.72 Apart from this, Elena Mizulina, one of the most char-
ismatic State Duma MPs, proposed in 2013 to add a provision to the 
Constitution of Russian Federation that Orthodoxy constitutes an ex-
clusive feature of the national cultural identity.73 Evgenii Fedorov, an-
other MP, submitted at the same time a wide number of amendments 
to the Constitution which appraised the spirit of Orthodoxy and justi-
fied the introduction of a dominant national ideology. Amongst other 
issues, Fedorov advocated the necessity to remove any reference to the 
‘alien’ norms of Western-originated international law, which would 
make the latter inapplicable in the Russian judicial system.74 
As for the most recent updates, it was in December 2016 that Putin 
signed the Doctrine of Information Security of Russian Federation. In 
a few of its provisions – in particular III.12. – one may find a clear ref-
erence to the uniqueness of moral and spiritual values of a multi-na-
tional Russian population; the values which require defence as being 
eroded and distorted by external foes.75 It is also important to mention 
that the Doctrine constitutes a part of the military policy of Russia 
aimed at prevention and prompt resolution of armed conflicts through 
information means.76 
Speaking of the individual engagement of the contemporary ‘mes-
sianic’ philosophers into the state’s political affairs, one should bear in 
mind that Kholmogorov cooperated with Putin’s United Russia party in 
2007. He led the ‘Russian Project’ in the media and tried to stimulate 
public discussion on the nature of patriotism and faith.77 Narochnits-
kaia was appointed in 2008 as a chair of the branch of the Institute for 
Democracy and Cooperation in Paris, a Kremlin-supported think tank, 
which conveys Russian cultural messages to the West.78 She also served 
as an active contributor to the Presidential Commission to Counter At-
tempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests (active 
2009-12).79 Not to mention that between 2003 and 2007 Narochnits-
kaia, as MP, represented the interests of the national-conservative party 
Rodina in the State Duma. As of Dugin, he is considered to have a sig-
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nificant influence on Putin’s advisers Yakunin and Glazyev. He cannot 
boast, however, of a direct connection to the President. Dugin’s major 
impact on Russian policy-making is through his publishing activity, me-
dia presence, networking, and establishing international connections.80 
The linchpin between messianism and statecraft in Russia can also 
be observed in the evocation and circulation of the Nuclear Orthodoxy 
concept.81 The concept as such belongs to Kholmogorov. In its core, it 
advocates the necessity for the Orthodox narratives to constitute an 
ideological filling for the national military and, in such a way, justify 
Russia’s transformation into an ultimate defender of humankind, the 
‘force for good’. Russian leadership seems to regard this concept with 
certain sympathy. For instance, Putin once stated that the Orthodox 
faith and the nuclear shield became the guarantors of Russian sover-
eignty and provided the backbone of Russian security on the domestic 
and international levels.82 Apart from this, Patriarch Cyryl has chosen 
Holy Great Martyr Barbara to be the heavenly protector of the Rus-
sian nuclear deterrent. As the Patriarch stated, Holy Barbara is the only 
saint to inspire soldiers and officers with clear minds, love for their 
motherland, and feeling of responsibility before God and their nation-
als.83 It is needless to reiterate again that President and Patriarch are on 
very good friendly terms. 
Conclusion
The hypothesis outlined at the very beginning of this article proved to 
be correct. The religious self-identification and messianic narrations 
are unalienable constituents of Russian domestic and foreign policies. 
They should be taken into consideration by scholars and politicians 
when attempting to analyse the Kremlin’s policy-making.
In their essence, messianic narrations are the multifarious messages 
which circulate nationwide and convey transcendental justifications 
for pursuing certain external and domestic policies, often expansion-
ist, imperialist and irrational. These narrations portray the target na-
tion as the one chosen by the God to withstand the unceasing assaults 
of the ‘global evil’ (usually vaguely defined) and secure the preservation 
of humankind. In this light, messianism appears to be the ideology – or 
the mass-shared belief – which advocates the perception of the target 
nation as an ultimate ‘true doer’ or the tool of God. For messianism 
to gain momentum, it requires a certain political order – usually with 




Russian messianic narrations and understandings of statehood have 
evolved significantly from the Middle Ages but continue to be inter-
twined and to praise similar political convictions. These are necessary 
to regard Russia as the mythical Third Rome, heir to Byzantium, un-
ceasing empire, and the last harbour (Katechon) of true religion, which 
is the Orthodoxy. Four of the most outspoken masterminds who 
develop this field of political philosophy are Aleksander Dugin (con-
servative and Eurasionist), Nataliia Narochnitskaia (neo-pan-Slavist), 
Egor Kholmogorov (nationalist and pragmatic imperialist), and Vadim 
Tsymburskii (isolationist). All of them were defined by Østbø as pro-
viding the most valuable and consistent impetus to the development of 
the four “schools” – more or less formalized – of Russian messianism. 
The differences in their views reside in the degree of interconnections 
between Orthodoxy and statehood, the degree of secularity of Russian 
messianic mission, and the degree of tolerance towards the West. 
Three out of the four mentioned philosophers portray Russia as an 
eternal voluntary defender against ‘global evil’ – or even a metaphys-
ical Antichrist – which may take different shapes and reveal itself in 
different ways: starting from development of ‘heretic’ technologies 
ending with the ‘apocalyptic’ trans-boundary terrorism. Non-Russian 
people may simply not understand the defensive Russian mission and 
mistreat its good intentions. Moreover, in case of resistance such peo-
ple become minions of the global evil, and thus foes. As paradoxically 
this may sound, Russia operates overseas for the sake of humankind; 
accepting this statement as an axiom one can better explain the regu-
larities in Russian foreign policy. Recalling Dugin, Russia has its own 
truth which is different from the Western one and the West should 
accept it.84 It is only Tsymburskii who favours Russian isolationism and 
claims that Russia in its post-Soviet borders returns to its true Ortho-
dox identity.
It would be incorrect, however, to overemphasize the role of messi-
anic narrations and religious self-identification in propelling Russia’s 
assertive foreign policy. The Kremlin’s strategies and approaches are 
much more sophisticated, with the Orthodox leitmotif immanently 
present though frequently implicit, furtive to a degree, and perhaps 
even deliberately disguised. Thus, at times deeper scrutiny is needed to 
uncover it, properly identify it, and assess its impact on Russian politi-
cal realities. That said, the impact is observable: the actors involved are 





figures and opinion makers who highlight the dogma of Orthodoxy in 
their public activities. There also exists a close institutional link be-
tween the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Foreign Minis-
try. Finally, the Russian media also reiterates certain religious messag-
es and shapes public opinion appropriately.85 
Addressing the Western philosophic and geopolitical views on Rus-
sia, however, one may hardly discover anything related to the acknowl-
edgement of messianism, exceptionalism, or a duty before humankind. 
Russia’s aggressive foreign policy was defined by numerous scholars 
and decision-makers as an existential threat. Some of the philosophers 
portrayed Russia not as a saviour, but as a nomadic barbarian. Bear-
ing this in mind, the rivalry between Orthodox Russia and the secular 
West should never come as a surprise; it cyclically reappears in history. 
Western disapproval is often perceived by Russian philosophers as 
a heretic deed. It is nothing but a deceptive measure of the disguised 
evil to undermine the true doing of Russian leaders in their attempts 
to strengthen the empire-defender and reinforce the Orthodox shield 
for the good of all humankind. Once again, three out of four addressed 
Russian philosophers reiterate that the assertiveness of their state is a 
way to fulfil a transcendent mission, which should not be criticized by 
secular Western thinkers as they simply do not understand it properly. 
Having accumulated enough resources, contemporary Russia at-
tempts to promote its kind of world view globally. For this reason, in 
December 2013 a new International Information Agency Russia Today 
(IIART) emerged and embraced its predecessor, the RIA Novosti. That 
was not an ordinary re-branding, however; an informational giant de-
livering uniformed messages domestically and externally came into 
being. Apart from this, the RT television network continues to broad-
cast in dozens of Western states and enjoys immense financial support 
from the Russian budget. For instance, in 2014 – after the Crimean 
annexation – state funding of the RT rose to 450 million US dollars.86 
Apparently, such generous investments allow the Kremlin to let the 
world know about Russian view on global affairs, as well as portray 
Russia as a dedicated, underestimated, struggling, but nevertheless 
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